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There is little disagreement among economists that monetary
policy affects the rate of inflation and, at least in the short run, the
level of real economic activity. From an operational perspective, many
central banks currently target a short-term market interest rate.
This is done on the premise that this instrument is linked more or
less stably to the final objectives of monetary policy through the so-
called transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Most of the literature on the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy implicitly assumes that once the monetary authority’s
target rate is changed, short-term market and retail banking rates
will follow suit—that is, there will be immediate and complete “pass-
through” to retail banking rates (see, for example, Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995; Bernanke and Gilchrist, 1999). If the pass-through to
banking interest rates were sluggish or incomplete, those specific
channels of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy that op-
erate through banking rates would also be affected.
Stickiness of retail banking interest rates was first documented
in the United States by Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and
Sharpe (1992). These authors study deposit rate setting using econo-
metric models that are based on theoretical models developed to
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analyze price stickiness in goods markets. Implicit in their analyses
is the notion that banks cannot influence the behavior of lending
rates because they are atomistic players in that market. Hence, the
authors assume that the pass-through to retail lending rates is im-
mediate and complete. They then investigate the degree to which
market power in the deposit market affects stickiness in deposit in-
terest rates by looking at disaggregated data from large surveys of
banks. Among other things, these early studies find that the pass-
through to deposit rates is asymmetric, with lower pass-through when
the market rate is increasing than when it is decreasing. These au-
thors interpret their findings of asymmetric pass-through as evidence
of market power in the deposit market.
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) were the first to measure and com-
pare the degree of pass-through to lending rates across countries,
with both developed and developing countries included in their sample.
Their empirical analysis is based on an autoregressive distributed lag
specification estimated with aggregate time series. They estimate
the response of lending rates to changes in money market rates at
different time horizons. They then regress these responses across
countries against various measures of financial market structure,
while also controlling for other country characteristics such as the
effects of interest rate volatility. The analysis thus not only docu-
ments the extent to which interest rate pass-through differs across
countries, but also tries to explain why this is the case. In particular,
the authors suggest that the following three factors might reduce the
degree of stickiness: the existence of a market for negotiable short-
term instruments; relatively limited volatility of money market rates;
and relatively weak barriers to entry (though they do not find evi-
dence that market concentration per se affects loan rate stickiness).
Based on these findings, they suggest that policymakers can enhance
the effectiveness of monetary policy by enriching the menu of short-
term marketable instruments and removing barriers to competition,
rather than trying to reduce the level of market concentration.
More recent studies of the interest rate pass-through use similar
econometric specifications, but they focus mostly on euro-area coun-
tries. Mojon (2000), for example, measures the degree of pass-through
for lending and deposit rates in five European countries: Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. He assumes that there
is full pass-through in the long run and concentrates on estimating its
size in the short term. He then goes on to study different interest rate
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across states of this cycle. His main findings are that retail rates
respond sluggishly to changes in the money market rate, that short-
term rates generally respond faster than long-term rates, and that
there is asymmetry in the degree of pass-through, with a larger pass-
through to lending rates when the money market rate increases than
when it decreases and the opposite effect for deposit rates. He also
finds that the results vary somewhat across countries. He conjec-
tures that this heterogeneity could be due to differences in the
microeconomic structure of the different countries’ banking systems,
but he provides no direct evidence on this.
A second example is provided by Bondt (2002), who estimates an
aggregate autoregressive distributed lag specification reparameterized
as an error-correction model for the euro area as a whole. In his
analysis, deposit and lending rates of different maturities are paired
with government bond yields of similar maturities. He finds that pass-
through is incomplete on impact for both lending and deposit rates,
reaching only 50 percent within a month, but that it is complete in
the long run for most lending rates.1
Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mojon (2000),2 and Bondt
(2002), this paper compares Chile with a number of other countries.
Specifically, it provides a set of stylized facts about the pass-through
in Chile and compares them against the benchmark of pass-through
in a group of advanced economies. We estimate the aggregate, dy-
namic reduced-form relation between the money market interest rate
and retail bank rates for Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, the
United States, and a number of European countries, based on monthly
data from 1993 to 2002, and we try to interpret the evidence in light
of previous studies and analyses.3 We do not, however, test explicit
hypotheses on the structure of the Chilean banking system. The analy-
sis is based on an autoregressive distributed lag specification
reparameterized as an error-correction model, which is a standard
methodology used in this literature. We estimate both the size and
the speed of the pass-through from policy to retail banking rates, in
the short run (on impact, within a month) and in the long run (in the
steady state).
1. The pass-through from policy interest rates to retail banking rates may still
be incomplete if the pass-through from policy rates to government bond yields is
incomplete.
2. See also Borio and Fritz (1995).
3. See Berstein and Fuentes (in this volume) for a complementary analysis
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For Chile, we also ask whether these estimates differ across states
of the interest rate or the monetary policy cycle and whether they
have changed over time, especially after the 1998 Asian crisis and
after the introduction of “nominalization” of the policy interest rate
target in 2001. By implementing these robustness checks, we provide
indirect evidence on whether the interest rate pass-through has been
affected by market power in the banking sector—consistent with the
findings of Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992)
for the United States and Mojon (2000) for Europe—or by other fac-
tors such as interest rate volatility—consistent with Cottarelli and
Kourelis (1994) for developing countries.
Our main conclusion is that the interest rate pass-through in Chile,
overall, is not significantly different from that of the other economies
considered. In particular, we find that the size of Chile’s long-run pass-
through is slightly smaller than that of Australia, Canada, and the United
States and is comparable to that of New Zealand and the European
countries in our sample. In Chile, however, the speed of the pass-through
is faster than in Australia, New Zealand, and several of the European
countries. Moreover, it is only slightly slower than the pass-through in
the prime rate for Canada and the United States in the short term.
We also find that both the size and the speed of the pass-through
decline as the maturity of the bank instruments considered increases,
not only for Chile but also for most of the countries in the sample.
Unlike the studies reviewed above, we do not find evidence for Chile
of significant asymmetry in the pass-through. We do find some
evidence of parameter instability over time, especially around the
1997–98 Asian and Russian crises, but we do not find marked evi-
dence that there has been any further significant difference following
the nominalization of Chile’s interest rate targets.
A distinctive institutional feature of Chile is that there are two
different types of domestic currency deposits and loan instruments:
standard nominal instruments and instruments denominated in the
Unidad de Fomento (UF), a unit of account that indexes financial
contracts and transactions to the previous month’s inflation rate. We
look at both nominal and UF interest rates, but find that the results
are broadly comparable, especially in the long run: the size of the
long-run pass-through is about the same across these instruments.
In the short run, however, the pass-through for most UF rates ap-
pears slightly smaller than the pass-through for nominal rates.
As we explain below, we interpret the aggregate evidence reported
on the symmetry and instability of the pass-through in Chile asRetail Bank Interest Rate Pass-through: Is Chile Atypical? 151
suggesting that the behavior of retail banking interest rates is likely
to be affected by factors other than market power in the banking
system, most notably external shocks. Chile is a very open economy
both on the current and the capital accounts of the balance of pay-
ments. The Chilean banking system is thus exposed to competition
and entry from foreign banks (even if its current structure appears
rather concentrated), and this might be mitigating the market power
of individual banks. At the same time, Chile’s openness, together
with the fact that the country was buffeted by significant external
shocks during our sample period, might have affected banks’ reac-
tions to policy changes. High external volatility may also force fre-
quent policy changes.
On balance, Chile’s interest rate pass-through at the aggregate
level does not appear too different from that of the other countries
considered. These results, however, would not be inconsistent with
the presence of some differences in the pass-through across individual
bank instruments. A natural extension of our work would therefore
be to investigate explicit structural hypotheses across countries based
on microeconomic data and the predictions of an open economy model
of banking system competition.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 de-
scribes the data we use and presents a brief review of key cross-
country similarities and differences in the raw data. Section 2 outlines
the empirical model used. Section 3 reports the estimation results,
and section 4 concludes.
1. THE DATA AND A FEW STYLIZED FACTS
This section describes the dataset we constructed, presents rel-
evant summary statistics, and highlights the main features of the
data and its key moments.
1.1 Sources and Definitions
In addition to Chile, we consider Australia, Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and the
United States. In all cases except Chile, the sample period is April
1993 to June 2002; for Chile, the sample ends in September 2002.
The data are from national central banks, the European Central Bank,
and the International Monetary Fund. A complete list of the interest152 Marco A. Espinosa-Vega and Alessandro Rebucci
rate series used is presented in the appendix. These series are also
featured in figures 1 through 7.
The money market rate is an overnight interbank lending rate.
The only exception is Australia, for which we use the thirteen-week
treasury bill rate owing to apparent anomalies in the data for the
interbank lending rate.
Retail interest rates are classified into three maturity buckets.
Retail interest rates on instruments with maturities of less than three
months are classified as short-term rates, rates on instruments with
maturities of three months to a year are classified as medium-term
rates, and rates on instruments with maturities of one to three years
are classified as long-term rates.
The lending rates are for commercial loans, with three excep-
tions: Canada’s medium- and long-term lending rates are for mort-
gages; the German long-term lending rate is for consumer loans; and
the Chilean rates are for both consumer loans and commercial loans.
For the United States, the only lending rate we consider is the prime
rate, which is the base on which many other loan rates are calcu-
lated. Canada’s short-term lending rate is defined similarly, while its
long-term lending rate is for one-year and three-year conventional
mortgages.4 The lending rates for Germany and Spain are averages
for transactions that took place throughout the month, while for Bel-
gium, France, and the Netherlands they are end-of-period rates. For
Australia and New Zealand, we do not have data on lending rates by
maturity. For New Zealand, therefore, we used the weighted aver-
age base business rate charged by the six largest banks (each bank
reports the average rate on new loans of all maturities weighted by
amount); for Australia, we used the weighted average rate charged
by banks on business loans.
Our deposit rate series are generally more homogeneous. Most
of them are for demand deposits, certificates of deposit, or time de-
posits, with maturities in the three buckets described above.5
4. Using the prime lending rate for Canada and, in particular, the United
States might bias the cross-country comparison against all other countries. In
fact, these are among the very few interest rate series displaying full pass-through
in the long run. The prime rate is a lending rate applied to the best borrowers. It
usually moves immediately following policy announcements to signal banks’ readi-
ness to move their pricing schedule, but it does not necessarily move one-to-one
with the policy rate. Therefore, it is not evident that pass-through should be
complete in the long run for prime rates.
5. We do not use short-term deposit rates for Belgium, France, and the Neth-
erlands, although they are available, because they do not appear to be market
determined.Figure 1. Short-term Deposit Rates and Money Market
Rates, 1993 to 2002 (percent)
Source: National central banks, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
a. Money market rate is replaced by thirteen-week treasury bill.Figure 2. Medium-term Deposit Rates and Money Market
Rates, 1993 to 2002 (percent)
Source: National central banks, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
a. Money market rate is replaced by thirteen-week treasury bill.Figure 3. Long-term Deposit Rates and Money Market Rates,
1993 to 2002 (percent)
Source: National central banks, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
a. Money market rate is replaced by thirteen-week treasury bill.Figure 5. Short-term Lending Rates and Money Market
Rates, 1993 to 2002 (percent)
Source: National central banks, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
Figure 4. Weighted Average Lending Rates and Money
Market Rates, 1993 to 2002 (percent)
Source: National central banks, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
a. Money market rate is replaced by 13-week treasury bill.Figure 6. Medium-term Lending Rates and Money Market
Rates, 1993 to 2002 (percent)
Source: National central banks, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.Figure 7. Long-term Lending Rates and Money Market
Rates, 1993 to 2002 (percent)
Source: National central banks, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.Retail Bank Interest Rate Pass-through: Is Chile Atypical? 159
For Chile, we consider both nominal domestic currency and UF
interest rates. Studying UF interest rates is important because most
bank intermediation was based on this unit of account before August
2001. At that time, the Chilean Central Bank stopped targeting the
UF-denominated money market rate and switched to more conven-
tional nominal interest rate targeting—a change we call nominalization
in the rest of the paper.
1.2 Summary Statistics for the Raw Data
Preliminary analysis of the data reveals some noteworthy simi-
larities and differences between Chile and the other countries consid-
ered. Over the sample period, Chilean interest rates are on average
higher, more volatile, and less persistent than the interest rates for
the other countries. In Chile, however, the degree of comovement
between retail bank interest rates and the money market rate is
essentially the same as in other countries. These stylized facts are
highlighted in tables 1 through 4, which report summary statistics
for the interest series of all countries considered.
Chilean data display the highest sample mean, even in UF terms,
while the Netherlands shows the lowest average level of interest rates
(table 1). This may reflect the generally higher rate of inflation in
Chile during most of our sample period, but it could also reflect other
factors, such as higher average risk premia or faster economic growth
in Chile. In any case, it is not evident whether or how higher average
interest rates per se might affect the pass-through.
Chilean data display the highest interest rate volatility, for both
UF and nominal rates, as measured by the sample standard devia-
tion (table 2). At all maturities, the interest rates for Australia, Canada,
and the United States exhibit the lowest volatility. Higher volatility
is usually associated with higher uncertainty, which in turn may slow
down agents’ reaction to change by exacerbating precautionary be-
havior and increasing the option value of waiting.
Chile has the lowest interest rate persistence in our sample, again
whether we look at UF or nominal rates (table 3). In contrast to all






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Retail Bank Interest Rate Pass-through: Is Chile Atypical? 163
Over the sample period, the null hypothesis that Chilean interest
rates have a unit root without drift can be rejected with 99 percent
confidence for all rates except the nominal long-term deposit rate.6
This hypothesis cannot be rejected for most other countries.
External shocks are more likely than policy to explain higher
volatility and lower persistence in Chile relative to other countries.
On the one hand, the lower persistence of interest rates in Chile may
suggest that there have been periods in which the central bank was
not willing to smooth rates to the same extent as some other central
banks in the sample. Prior to the recent switch to nominal interest
rate targeting, the UF money market rate—the old target rate—
followed a fairly smooth pattern, except during the Asian and Rus-
sian financial crises (see figure 2). On the other hand, it is also pos-
sible that the Chilean economy has simply been subject to larger and
more frequent external shocks than the other economies throughout
sample period. For instance, Edwards (1998) emphasizes the role of
external factors in explaining interest rate volatility in emerging econo-
mies. In addition, Caballero (2000) argues that the financial reforms
adopted in Chile in recent years may have produced speedier trans-
mission of external shocks, which in turn would imply greater mea-
sured volatility. Larger and more frequent external shocks than in
other countries would naturally require more frequent adjustments
of policy interest rates.
In any case, all countries in the sample exhibit a relatively high
degree of contemporaneous correlation between retail banking inter-
est rates and the relevant money market rate (table 4 and figures 1
through 7). For Chile, in particular, the first principal component
explains more than 90 percent of the variability of the ten interest
rate series considered, suggesting that a single common factor ex-
plains most of the comovement of these data (results not reported).7
The relatively high value of the simple correlation between the money
market rate and retail bank rates also suggests that this common
factor is most likely associated with domestic monetary policy.
Interestingly, table 4 shows that the strength of this correlation
tends to decline with the maturity of the retail rate in most countries.
6. The regression includes a constant, a linear trend, and a variable number
of lags between one and five. These results are not reported in the paper, but they
are available from the authors on request (as are all other nonreported results).
7. Since we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the Chilean interest
rate series, cointegration tests would not be informative on the degree of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4Retail Bank Interest Rate Pass-through: Is Chile Atypical? 165
In addition, an analysis of the lagged autocorrelation between the
money market interest rate and retail bank rates shows that it is
highest within the first month for most of the countries considered.
However, changes in money market rates do not seem to pass through
completely to retail banking rates, except for Australia, Canada, and
the United States. In fact, money market rates appear more volatile
than the retail rates.
A first look at the (unconditional) moments of the data thus sug-
gests that there are both important similarities and differences be-
tween Chile and the group of other countries considered: Chilean
interest rates comove with the policy rate as strongly as those of
other countries, with the strength of this comovement decreasing
with the maturity of the bank instrument analyzed. In addition, the
volatility of the policy rate is slightly higher than the volatility of
retail interest rates, as in most other countries. This indicates that
policy and retail interest rates generally move very closely together,
even though not all changes in the former are passed on to the latter.
However, the average level and volatility of Chilean interest rates is
higher than in other countries, while persistence is lower.
As we shall see in the next section, if the degree of (conditional)
comovement between policy and retail interest rates is comparable
across countries, then lower persistence in Chilean rates would most
likely be due to higher volatility. It would follow that the key differ-
ence between Chile and other countries would be the greater inter-
est rate volatility in Chile. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier,
both interest rate volatility and market power in the banking system
may affect the pass-through process. In the last section of the paper,
therefore, we compare the pass-through across countries and try to
investigate the relative role of volatility and market power in this
process by using a simple aggregate, dynamic reduced-form econo-
metric model, which we now present.
2. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
To analyze the dynamic reduced-form relation between retail
banking interest rates and the money market rate, we first specify
and estimate the following simple autoregressive distributed lag
(ARDL) model:
1 4 1 3 2 1 − − ο α + α + α + α + α = t t t t MMR RtailR MMR t RtailR , (1)166 Marco A. Espinosa-Vega and Alessandro Rebucci
where RTAILR is the relevant bank interest rate, MMR is the money
market rate, and t is a time trend. The trend is intended to capture
the disinflation process and other factors that change slowly over
time (for example, financial market liberalization and other struc-
tural reforms).
For all the countries considered, we specify equation (1) including
only one lag of both the retail and the policy interest rate, which is
here assumed to be exogenous—a reasonable assumption within the
month. For Chile, standard lag-length selection criteria over the en-
tire sample period cannot reject this one-lag specification. This sug-
gests that there is no serial autocorrelation in the residuals and thus
no need to consider a higher-order dynamic (results not reported).
For the other countries, however, we impose this lag-structure a priori,
without testing its adequacy, to ensure full comparability with the
Chilean specification.
Comparing time series models across countries always implies a
trade-off between the need to implement the comparison as neatly as
possible and the need to fit models to individual countries as well as
possible. If we used different lags for different countries, we would
risk losing full comparability. Running the exercise with a common
specification across countries, however, carries the risk of comparing
Chile with other countries on the basis of a model that is possibly
misspecified for other countries. In principle, one could try to deter-
mine the optimal lag length for each interest rate series and country
considered, but that would involve a core set of about 60 regressions
in our analysis. We thus prefer a common parsimonious specification
across all countries and interest rate series because it would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to uncover the “true” lag length for all cases
considered. Moreover, as the sample period is not very long, we would
lose efficiency by considering specifications with longer lag structures.
Following Hendry (1995), we then reparameterize and reestimate
the ADL in equation (1) as the following error-correction model (ECM):
where
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8. As noted, all Chilean interest series are stationary, while most non-Chilean
series appear to have a unit root. Therefore, in the case of Chile, it would be
pointless to investigate the presence of cointegration between the money market
and retail interest rates. For the other countries, we find that a standard aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on the estimated long-run relation (RTAILR –
β 0β 1t – β 2MMR) rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root in most cases. This suggests
the presence of cointegration in the vast majority of the cases analyzed.
The parameters of equation (2) are linked to the parameters of
equation (1) by equation (3). Hence, estimating the former equation
allows all the parameters of the latter to be recovered (and vice versa)
without altering the estimated residuals. From a statistical point of
view, however, the two representations are not equivalent: if the
series are stationary, or nonstationary but cointegrated, then the
parameters of equation (2) may be estimated more efficiently because
the error-correction term and individual series represented in first
differences are less likely to be collinear. If the series are integrated
but do not cointegrate, then neither representation is statistically
satisfactory.8
In equation (2), the term ∆RtailRt = α 2∆MMRt + β 3 (RtailRt-1  – β 0–
β 1t – β 2MMRt-1 ), which represents the lagged deviation of the retail
interest rate from its steady state value, can be interpreted as the
solution of a representative bank’s optimization problem, as, for in-
stance, in the model developed by Bondt (2002) and those reviewed by
Freixas and Rochet (1998, chap. 3). Nonetheless, since our empirical
analysis is not tied to any particular structural model, we use equa-
tion (2) simply to characterize the dynamic, reduced-form relation
between retail and money market interest rates.
Our empirical results focus particularly on the degree of pass-
through in the short term (α 2, or the size of the pass-through on
impact and thus within a month), the degree of pass-through in the
long run (β 2, or the size of the pass-through in the long run or in
steady state), and the speed of adjustment to the long-run value (β 3).
The latter variable, together with α 2, determines the average num-
ber of months needed to reach the long run of the pass-through:
(1 – α 2) /β 3. This is sometimes called the mean lag.
3. RESULTS
In this section, we report and discuss the estimation results. We
begin by presenting a set of benchmark results for all the countries168 Marco A. Espinosa-Vega and Alessandro Rebucci
considered. We then check whether these results are robust across
different states of the interest rate or monetary policy cycle and stable
over time. We perform these robustness checks only for Chile. These
tests help us interpret the small cross-country differences in pass-
through that we detect in the benchmark results.
3.1 Is Chile’s Interest Rate Pass-through Atypical?
The benchmark set of estimation results reported in table 5 sug-
gests that, overall, Chile’s interest rate pass-through is not atypical.
In Chile, the pass-through appears incomplete even in the long-run,
but this is also true for most European countries, for New Zealand,
and for Australian deposit rates.9 Pass-through appears complete only
in the case of the Australian lending rate analyzed, Canada, and the
United States. For Chile, however, the size of the short-term pass-
through is larger than in Europe, Australia, or New Zealand. As a
result, the Chilean mean lag is markedly smaller than in Europe,
and it is comparable to that in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United States. In fact, the mean lag for Chile is at most four
months, compared with a mean lag of at most two months for New
Zealand and the United States.10
As one might expect, the shorter the maturity of the bank lending
or deposit instrument, the larger and faster the pass-through. For
given maturities, there appears to be only a small difference between
deposit and loan rates. Moreover, in the case of Chile, we find little
difference between the pass-through to UF and nominal interest rates.
Chile and Europe display slightly less than full pass-through, but
the reasons appear different. In Chile, incomplete but relatively fast
pass-through appears more likely to be due to external macroeconomic
factors than to market power in the banking system, if one is willing to
assume that lower persistence in interest rates is primarily due to
external shocks. In the case of Europe, the existing literature points
9. The reported estimate for Europe is an average of the individual country
estimates. The literature on dynamic panel data models (for example, Pesaran
and Smith, 1995) shows that such an average may yield a consistent estimate of
the typical relation in the cross section. Its efficiency may be questioned in this
case given the small number of country estimates available, but such an averag-
ing is statistically legitimate and economically sensible.
10. The mean lag for short-maturity interest rates in Chile is less than a
month. It follows that one should not expect a statistically significant difference
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11. This interpretation is consistent with the observation by Cottarelli and
Kourelis (1994) that reducing the fluctuations in money market rates could help
enhance the size of pass-through, although they tie a reduction in the money
market rate volatility to structural regulatory changes, rather than external shocks.
to some role for market power in the banking sector.11 As evident
from equation (3), for a given size of the short-term pass-through
(α 2 + α 4), the size of the long-run pass-through (β 2) is an increasing
function of the persistence parameter, α 3, which in turn is a decreas-
ing function of interest rate volatility. Chile’s long-run pass-through
and the correlation between money market and retail interest rates
is comparable to Europe’s (tables 4 and 5). At the same time, the
short-term pass-through is higher in Chile than in Europe, while in-
terest rate persistence (and volatility) of both money market and re-
tail interest rates is lower (higher) in Chile than in Europe (table 3),
thus reconciling the differences and similarities noted in section 1, as
well as the econometric results reported here.
How to interpret these results? Chile has a financial structure in
which domestic capital markets have played an increasingly impor-
tant role over the last decade. In addition, the Chilean banking sys-
tem is exposed to competition not only from domestic capital markets
but also from foreign banks. The Chilean banks might thus have lim-
ited market power even if the banking system exhibits some degree
of concentration—at least with regard to the largest borrowers that
have access to both domestic and foreign capital markets.
This conjecture is not incompatible with some role for banks’ be-
havior in the explanation of incomplete pass-through, but it de-em-
phasizes the role of market power to highlight the role of the relatively
high degree of openness to trade in goods and assets of the Chilean
economy. Domestic and foreign banks operate in a rather volatile
external environment by international standards. As noted in section
1, bank intermediation may be riskier in Chile than in other econo-
mies (because of the more volatile external environment or other
reasons). Indeed, banks’ pricing decisions might be slowed down by
the high degree of uncertainty. On the other hand, banks might also
react promptly to monetary policy impulses, but external shocks force
frequent and sometimes sharp policy changes in policy rates, result-
ing in a fast but less than full pass-through, on average. Either way,
by affecting banks’ behavior or interest rate persistence, volatility
induced by external shocks might result in slower and more incom-
plete pass-through than otherwise.Retail Bank Interest Rate Pass-through: Is Chile Atypical? 171
If incomplete pass-through were due mainly to market power in
the banking system, one would expect this to result in an asymmet-
ric pass-through in periods of increasing and decreasing interest rates.
On the other hand, if external shocks were the main factor affecting
pass-through incompleteness, one would expect to find evidence of a
more complete pass-through before the Asian, Russian, Brazilian, and
Argentine crises that buffeted Chile after June 1997. While we can-
not discriminate between these two competing hypothesis based only
on aggregate macroeconomic data, in the next two subsections, we
assess the robustness of the benchmark estimation results presented
here and their interpretation by investigating whether the Chilean
pass-through is characterized by asymmetries across states of the
interest rate cycle or by instability over time.
3.2 Is Chile’s Interest Rate Pass-through
Asymmetric?
To investigate this hypothesis, we follow Sarno and Thornton
(2003) in creating a dummy variable that is equal to one if the retail
rate is above or equal to its long-run equilibrium level—given by the
estimated error-correction term (RTAILR – β 0 – β 1t – β 2MMR)—and
zero otherwise. We then reestimate the model in equation (2) by in-
teracting the coefficients α 2 and β 3 with this dummy.12 We thus ob-
tain estimates for the size of the short-term pass-through and its
speed of adjustment in the two states of the interest rate cycle, which
we call interest rate tightening and easing, respectively.
Surprisingly, we find little evidence of asymmetry in the pass-
through for Chile when measured in this manner (table 6). In most
cases, either the estimates of the parameter of interest in one state
are not statistically different from those in the other state or the
significant differences have the wrong sign.
The approach used by Sarno and Thornton (2003) to investigate
these asymmetries does not address whether the deviations from the
long-run equilibrium relationship are caused by changes in the stance
of monetary policy or other temporary shocks. We experimented with
a different dummy to explore the possibility that asymmetric behav-
ior is more pronounced when the deviations from the long-run equi-
librium are associated with policy shocks. This variable tracks















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3Retail Bank Interest Rate Pass-through: Is Chile Atypical? 173
tightening and easing in the monetary policy stance more closely
than the previous approach, and it is based on the publicly announced
target for the money market interest rate (figure 8).13 Again, as shown
in table 6, we find little evidence of asymmetry in the pass-through
for Chile irrespective of the source of the deviation from the long run
equilibrium.
13. This variable, called forward (backward) dummy in figure 8, is equal to
one if the next (previous) policy change is an interest rate target decrease. This
approach is similar to the one used by Mojon (2000), who identifies interest rate
cycles directly by inspecting plots of retail interest rates. We also considered the
possibility of disentangling the impact of the banking structure on the pass-through
by comparing the response of retail banking rates with that of market interest
rates of similar maturities. However, data availability prevented us from carrying
out this type of analysis.
Figure 8. Chile: Timing of the Monetary Policy Cycle,
1993 to 2002
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and IMF staff estimates.174 Marco A. Espinosa-Vega and Alessandro Rebucci
Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) find
evidence of asymmetric pass-through for deposit rates in the United
States and concluded that the most likely explanation is banking
market power. It might be possible to conclude, on the basis of their
argument, that the lack of asymmetric pass-through for the Chilean
banking system means absence of market power. This evidence can-
not be conclusive, however. In fact, using bank level data, Bernstein
and Fuentes (in this volume) find evidence that they interpret as
suggesting that market power may be present in some segments of
the Chilean banking system.
3.3 Is Chile’s Interest Rate Pass-through Stable
over Time?
To determine whether Chile’s interest rate pass-through has
changed in recent years as a result of international crises, changes in
the exchange rate regime, and, most recently, the nominalization of
monetary policy, we follow Morandé and Tapia (2002) by reestimat-
ing the model over three progressively longer samples: a subsample
that excludes the Argentine crisis and the nominalization of mon-
etary policy (so that it ends in June 2001), a subsample that excludes
the whole free-floating period (this sample ends in June 1999), and a
subsample that excludes the entire Asian-Russian financial crisis pe-
riod (and subsequent periods, ending in June 1997). Table 7 reports
the estimates of our parameters of interest for Chile.
The evidence on parameter stability suggests that the pass-through
might have slowed down in the post-1997 period. There is less evi-
dence, however, that things changed further after 1997. The esti-
mates for UF-denominated interest rates based on the sample through
June 1997, in particular, appear to differ somewhat from those ob-
tained on longer samples. These estimates display larger pass-through
in the long run than those based on longer sample periods.14
Summary statistics on the raw data are consistent with this econo-
metric evidence: table 2 indicates that the standard deviation of UF-
denominated interest rates through June 1997 is only about a third
14. Those estimates of the long-run pass-through based on the shortest sample
period that appear equal to zero result from an estimated α 4 equal in size to α 2 but of
the opposite sign, thus annihilating the term (α 2 + α 4) and hence also the long-term
pass-through. These are cases in which a different, possibly even shorter lag length

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6176 Marco A. Espinosa-Vega and Alessandro Rebucci
of that computed on longer sample periods, while table 3 shows that
the persistence of the money market rate is about 25 percent higher.
This suggests a break after mid-1997. The fact that the break oc-
curred at the time of the Asian and Russian crises supports the view
that pass-through incompleteness, in the case of Chile, is more likely
due to external shocks than to market power in the banking system.
The changes in exchange rate and monetary policy regimes that
took place in September 1999 and August 2001, respectively, do not
appear to have had much impact on the interest rate pass-through
over and above the impact of the external environment. The esti-
mates based on the two sub-samples through June 2001 and June
1999 are essentially identical to that based on the entire sample pe-
riod (through September 2002). In particular, though it might be early
to assess the effects of nominalization of monetary policy, these re-
sults suggest that nominalization has had no significant impact on
the interest rate pass-through.
A standard stability test based on recursive ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates from April 1997 onward confirms the broad thrust of
the these conclusions. As shown in figure 9, the estimated model
displays clear signs of parameter instability around the time of the
Asian and Russian and only much weaker evidence of instability after
mid-1999 and mid-2001.
Figure 9. Chile: One-step Chow Test, 1993 to 2002aRetail Bank Interest Rate Pass-through: Is Chile Atypical? 177
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have conducted an empirical analysis of the
pass-through of changes in money market interest rates to retail bank-
ing deposit and lending interest rates. We have compared Chile with
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and five Euro-
pean countries. Based on broadly comparable aggregate monthly data
from 1993 to 2002 and an identical standard error-correction econo-
metric specification, we found that, overall, Chile’s pass-through is
not atypical. Although our results indicate that Chile’s pass-through
is incomplete in the long run, the same holds for most of the other
countries considered. Chilean interest rates are more volatile and
less persistent than in many other countries, but the pass-through in
the short term is larger than in many of these countries. Chile’s pass-
through is also faster than in most other countries.
Source: IMF staff estimates.
a. P values less than 0.05 (that is, greater than 95 percent significance). The null hypothesis is parameter
stability.
Figure 9. (continued)178 Marco A. Espinosa-Vega and Alessandro Rebucci
Slow or incomplete pass-through is usually attributed to market
power in the banking system. This paper, however, suggests that
external volatility should be considered more carefully as a possible
factor giving rise to pass-through incompleteness in a small open
economy. Indeed, we have argued that it is plausible that external
volatility could be responsible for a fast but incomplete pass-through
in Chile.
We find no significant evidence of asymmetric behavior across
states of the interest rate cycle, regardless of the criterion used to
identify different states of the cycle. On the other hand, we do find
some evidence of parameter instability around the time of the Asian
crisis. The pass-through mechanisms appear faster and more com-
plete before June 1997 (that is, before the Asian and Russian crises),
especially for UF-denominated interest rates. However, we showed
that neither the switch to a fully flexible exchange rate regime in
1999 nor the adoption of nominal interest rate targeting in August
2001 seems to have affected pass-through markedly.
These results are consistent with the view that the differences
between Chile and the other countries we have studied, if any, are due
mainly to external shocks, rather than to differences in market power
in the banking system or to the recent changes in Chile’s exchange
rate and monetary policy regimes. It would therefore be interesting to
evaluate this hypothesis more rigorously on microeconomic data based
on the predictions of a banking sector model of imperfect competition
in an open economy.APPENDIX
Interest Rate Descriptions and Abbreviations










































Monetary policy rate of the Central Bank, used
for setting the interbank lending rate. Real
rate through July 2001; real rate is derived
from nominal thereafter
Nominal money market rate: overnight interbank
lending rate
UF money market rate: overnight interbank
lending rate adjusted by previous month’s
inflation
Nominal deposit rate on commercial and con-
sumer deposits of 30 to 89 days
Nominal deposit rate on commercial and con-
sumer deposits of 90 to 365 days
Deposit rate on commercial and consumer de-
posits in UF of 90 to 365 days
Nominal deposit rate on commercial and con-
sumer deposits of 1 to 3 years
Deposit rate on commercial and consumer de-
posits in UF of 1 to 3 years
Nominal lending rate on commercial and con-
sumer loans of 30 to 89 days
Nominal lending rate on commercial and con-
sumer loans of 90 to 365 days
Lending rate on commercial and consumer loans
in UF of 90 to 365 days
Nominal lending rate on commercial and con-
sumer loans of 1 to 3 years
Lending rate on commercial and consumer loans
in UF of 1 to 3 years
Weighted average interest rate on peso loans
Weighted average interest rate on UF loans
Thirteen-week treasury bill used because of
irregularities in the money market rate.
Bank deposits of 3 months
Bank deposits of 6 months
Bank deposits of 1 year
Weighted average of all loans
Overnight interbank rate
Deposits of less than 3 months
Deposits of 3 months to 1 year
Commercial loans of 6 months
Commercial loans of up to 1 year


































































Overnight interbank lending rate
Commercial certificates of deposit of 30 days
Commercial certificates of deposit of 90 days
Prime business short-term lending rate
Conventional mortgage rate, 1 year
Conventional mortgage rate, 3 years
Call money rate
Deposits of up to 3 months
Deposits of 1 to 2 years
Commercial loans of up to 1 year
Commercial loans of over 1 year
Overnight interbank rate
Deposits of 1 to 3 months
Deposits of 3 months to 1 year
Deposits of over 3 months notice period
Commercial loans of up to 1 year
Consumer loans of greater than 1 year
Overnight interbank rate
Demand deposits
Deposits of 2 years
Commercial loans of up to 1 year
Overnight interbank rate
Deposits of overnight
Deposits of 1 to 2 years
Commercial loans of up to 1 year
Commercial loans of 1 to 3 years
Overnight interbank rate
Call deposit rate
Bank deposits of 6 months
Weighted average of all loans
Overnight interbank lending rate
Average of dealer offering rates on nationally
traded certificates of 1-month deposits
Average of dealer offering rates on nationally
traded certificates of 3-month deposits
Deposits of 9 to 12 months at the Federal Home
Loan Bank of New York
Prime lending rate: overnight loans to
businesses
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